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The Supreme People’s Court, China
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
ON 13 JULY 2017, the 2010 Nobel Peace laureate Liu 
Xiaobo 刘晓波	 passed away at the age of sixty-one. 
Tried and convicted in 2009 for ‘inciting subversion 
of state power’ for having co-authored Charter 08, a 
political manifesto calling for China’s democratic 
transformation, Liu is only the second Nobel Peace 
Prize laureate ever to die in custody (the first being 
Carl von Ossietzky, an anti-Nazi pacifist, in 1938).1
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His tragic fate — along with that of his wife Liu Xia 刘霞, who has 
spent years under house arrest despite never being charged with any 
crime — is a harsh reminder of Beijing’s stance on human rights. In the 
post-Mao age, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has consistently an-
swered international criticism about its human rights abuses by insisting 
that the ‘universalist’ definition of human rights is a Western construct. 
In view of its own cultural tradition and developmental trajectory, the 
PRC has upheld the view that the realisation of economic and social 
rights, the right to development in particular, is of primary importance. 
In the official worldview of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is not 
a violation of human rights to deny basic civil and political liberties to its 
citizens, with freedom of expression being only one example. The Party- 
state measures human rights achievements in terms of the number of 
people who have been raised out of poverty,2 while detaining advocates 
for civil and political liberties, even those who protest against sexual har-
assment or speak out against corruption, despite corruption itself being 
Liu Xiaobo’s ashes were scattered in the Yellow Sea (Liu Xia pictured centre, wearing sunglasses) 
Source: YouTube
a crime. Over the past several years, hun-
dreds of rights activists have been detained 
in China. (See the China Story Yearbook 
2015: Pollution, Chapter 2 ‘The Fog of Law’, 
pp.67–85, and the China Story Yearbook 
2016: Control, Chapter 2 ‘Control by Law’, 
pp.43–57.) In September 2017, Kenneth 
Roth, the director of Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) went as far as to declare that ‘Chi-
na’s [current] crackdown on human rights activists is the most severe 
since the Tiananmen Square democracy movement twenty-five years ago’.
The example of Liu Xiaobo also illustrates how, despite having an 
increasingly sophisticated legal system, the PRC, like other authoritarian 
regimes, is apt to use its laws and the loopholes therein to incriminate 
and eliminate political enemies. Criminal charges of ‘inciting subversion 
of state power’ and ‘subversion of state power’ are often invoked against 
individuals who allegedly challenge state security, social stability, and the 
political status quo. All the while, the PRC denies that it has political pris-
oners in its jails, insisting that people like Liu Xiaobo are just criminals. At 
the same time, his widow Liu Xia’s experience is testimony to the existence 
of a dual system, whereby the law applies in ‘ordinary’ cases but not in 
those circumstances that the authorities consider politically sensitive. 
Liu Xiaobo’s death and the reaction to it by the international commu-
nity testify to the increasingly prominent role that China plays in shaping 
human rights discourse within a divided international community. This 
essay analyses the mechanisms of the three main, and largely comple-
mentary, means through which the Chinese authorities attempt to rein in 
dissent within and outside of the law: judicial prosecution, torture, and 
harassment of relatives and friends.
Kenneth Roth
Photo: Wikimedia Commons
C
H
IN
A
 S
TO
R
Y 
YE
A
R
B
O
O
K
20
17
260
261
H
um
an
 R
ig
ht
s 
in
 th
e 
Ag
e 
of
 P
ro
sp
er
ity
El
is
a 
N
es
os
si
 a
nd
 Iv
an
 F
ra
nc
es
ch
in
i
BADIUCAO, by Linda Jaivin
In February, AsiaTOPA (the Asia–Pacific Tri-
ennial of Performing Arts) brought the Na-
tional Ballet of China to the Melbourne Arts 
Centre to perform the Cultural Revolution 
propaganda ballet, ‘The Red Detachment of 
Women’ 红色娘子军. Off to one side, watch-
ing the opening night crowd file in, was the 
Shanghai-born grandson of a filmmaker 
who starved to death in one of Mao’s labour 
camps and whose family suffered greatly in 
the Cultural Revolution. An artist and car-
toonist who goes by the pseudonym Badiu-
cao 巴丢草, he wondered how it is possible 
that a democratic country such as Australia 
would so happily showcase what he consid-
ers an analogue to Nazi art.3 And he was 
not alone: one Melbourne critic likened the 
ballet to the spoof ‘Springtime for Hitler’ in 
Mel Brooks’s The Producers.4 Badiucao did 
not join the small protest on the night, tak-
ing a stand in his own way with cartoons of 
Mao singing into a microphone while sodo-
mising a kangaroo and emu.
Badiucao paints and creates installation and performance art. His 2016 work Cancelled 
reflects on how the Chinese embassy returned his Chinese passport to him with one corner 
cut after he took Australian citizenship. The installation displays objects of personal and 
cultural identity including a laptop and Chinese spoon, each with a corner crisply excised. 
He has also turned a critical eye on his new country: Don Dale Play Group (also 2016) was a 
response to revelations about the abuse of Aboriginal youth in detention. 
He is best known for his China-related cartoons and drawings, which draw inspiration 
from German Impressionism and woodblock printing — an aesthetic championed by early 
twentieth-century Chinese revolutionaries such as Lu Xun. In one cartoon, Xi Jinping hunch-
es over a tub labelled #PanamaLeaks, laundering hundred-yuan bills; in another, a Mao-like 
cat catches a computer mouse — a comment on censorship. 
Badiucao is adept at social media, with 29,100 Twitter followers alone at the time of writ-
ing. He regularly uploads cartoons and his stark portraits of Chinese human rights activists 
Badiucao’s portrait of Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia in 
Hosier Lane, Melbourne
Photo: @badiucao, Twitter
not only onto www.badiucao.
com but also Google Drive 
for free download. Amnesty 
International, the BBC, and 
chinadigitaltimes.net have all 
republished his work.
In July 2017, Badiucao 
drew a double portrait of Liu 
Xiaobo and his wife Liu Xia, 
based on an official photo-
graph of them when Liu was 
sick in hospital, and posted it 
in Melbourne’s graffiti-covered Hosier Lane. After Liu’s death, he added a second image 
of him ascending into heaven, with a halo on his head and his slippers discarded on the 
ground. The Hosier Lane site quickly became a shrine, with people leaving flowers and other 
offerings (see photo) and the images went viral. Because they are relatively abstract, activ-
ists in China briefly got away with posting them on the Internet. 
The images have since appeared in public spaces around the world. Yet after the double 
portrait was reproduced on a Melbourne University campus wall, it quickly disappeared 
under a slew of posters for a Chinese-language website. Coincidentally or not, it also 
vanished not long after going up in Sydney University’s Graffiti Tunnel. During my interview 
with him, Badiucao expressed concern at the many ways that China is extending its power 
overseas, including in universities, where slurs such as ‘racist’ and ‘anti-China’ help to 
silence and control debate and criticism. He believes that social isolation makes Chinese 
students especially vulnerable to manipulation, and would like to see more social ‘inclusion’ 
as inoculation against a radical patriotism.5 
Badiucao does not sound paranoid when he says that Chinese agents and Internet 
sleuths are working hard to uncover his true identity: ‘I have been warned they are get-
ting close’. They have trolled him relentlessly on social media from his first appearances 
on Weibo — a platform from which he’s now banned. Learning that he had studied to be 
a teacher, they fabricated stories about improper behaviour around children and created 
a fake website, badiucao.net, filled with slanderous content. (By August 2017, the fake site 
appeared to have been taken down.) Although an Australian citizen, he is worried enough 
about his job, personal safety, and family that he lives a double life — never making a public 
appearance without a mask of some kind. Until China itself becomes democratic and free, 
he says, the mask stays on. 
Another Badiucao cartoon in Hosier Lane
Photo: Colourourcity, Flickr
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Using the Law to Suppress Activism
As the latest annual report of the US Congressional- 
Executive Commission on China (CECC) noted, in 
2017 the Chinese authorities ‘continued to use the 
law as an instrument of repression to expand con-
trol over Chinese society, while outwardly provid-
ing the veneer of a system guided by the rule of 
law.’6 Chinese Party-state officials perceive human 
rights lawyers (weiquan 维权, or ‘rights defence’ 
lawyers) and civil society activists to be enemies 
of a stable and ‘harmonious’ society under the 
rule of law as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). (See the Chi-
na Story Yearbook 2015: Pollution, Chapter 2 ‘The Fog of Law’, pp.67–85.) 
Lawyers are considered particularly dangerous, because of their partici-
pation in the human rights discourse both at home and in international 
forums and media. Moreover, because of their plight, they often become 
international news themselves. Their pursuit of human rights claims at 
the grassroots leads them to become attached to ‘foreign’ ideas concerning 
human rights promoted by the Western organisations that support and 
cooperate with them. 
As in the past, human rights featured in the 2017 Supreme People’s 
Court’s (SPC) annual report, presented in March by Zhou Qiang 周强 — the 
current SPC President to the ‘Two Sessions’ (lianghui 两会) of the Chinese 
parliament, the National People’s Congress. Zhou’s report emphasised 
that the correct implementation of criminal justice policies protects hu-
man rights. But he also cited the sentencing ‘according to law’ of weiquan 
lawyer Zhou Shifeng 周世锋	 to seven years’ imprisonment as one of the 
previous year’s key achievements in protecting state security.7 
Judicial authorities continue widely to use provisions in the 1997 
Criminal Law concerning the crime of endangering state security 危害
国家安全罪, (Articles 102–113) to bring human rights activists to trial 
Zhou Qiang
Photo: 禁书网, Flickr
and sentence them to lengthy 
imprisonment. The majority 
of human rights lawyers and 
activists detained in recent 
years were convicted under 
the terms of Article 105: ‘incit-
ing subversion of state power’ 
颠覆国家政权罪	or ‘subversion 
of state power’ 煽动颠覆国家
政权罪. 
Since the end of 2016, the list of rights activists under arrest has 
grown. Weiquan lawyers Jiang Tianyong 江天勇 and Li Heping 李和平, 
as well as activists Liu Shaoming 刘少明, Su Changlan 苏昌兰, and Chen 
Qitang 陈启堂, were all handed prison sentences for ‘subversion’ or ‘incit-
ing subversion of state power’ in 2017. Their sentences ranged from three 
years to four and a half years, and most have been detained for at least 
seven months before trial. Lawyers Wang Quanzhang 王全章	and Wu Gan
吴淦 were arrested and detained on similar charges, but they were tried 
in closed-door trials and their sentence remains unknown. 
Another important case with significant international ramifications 
involved Taiwanese NGO volunteer Lee Ming-che 李明哲. In March 2017, 
the Chinese state security authorities detained him while he was travelling 
to Zhuhai via Macau. Ten days after his disappearance, the State Council 
Taiwan Affairs Office confirmed that he was under investigation for ‘en-
dangering state security’. On 26 May, state security authorities in Hunan 
formally arrested him on suspicion of ‘subversion of state power’. Lee’s 
trial took place in September at the Yueyang Intermediate Court in Hunan. 
In a clip recorded at the trial, most probably filmed under duress, Mr Lee 
said that he had ‘no objection’ to the charges of ‘attacking Chinese socie-
ty and encouraging multi-party rule’ and ‘inciting others to subvert state 
power’. They were similar to the charges against Liu Xiaobo. Filmed con-
fessions have become increasingly common in ‘open trials’.
Lee Ming-che
Source: TEIA, Flickr
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Torture
In 1988, the PRC ratified the International Convention against Torture. 
Over the following two decades, Chinese media and academic publications 
aired widespread condemnation of torture — a practice that the Chinese 
criminal legislation strictly prohibits under Articles 247–248 of the 1997 
Criminal Law and Article 54 of the 2012 Criminal Procedure Law.
Under Xi Jinping, the Decisions of the Third and Fourth CCP Plenums 
in 2013 and 2014 also mention the strict prohibition of torture. Among 
the official affirmations of this principle are the 2013 Political-Legal Com-
mittee Provisions on Preventing Miscarriage of Justice 关于切实防止冤假
错案的规定, which states that instances of torture and extracting con-
fession through violent means or other acts of forgery should be severe-
ly punished — without specifying how — and that evidence obtained 
through torture or other illegal means is inadmissible in court. Similar 
points are made in the SPC’s Opinions on Preventing Miscarriages of Jus-
tice 关于建立健全防范刑事冤假错案工作机制的意见, of the same year. 
They both require judges to follow legal procedures strictly, and remind 
courts of appeal to countercheck judgements for which the evidence was 
sketchy or the facts unclear. The documents define illegally obtained ev-
idence as confessions obtained outside a legal place of detention, and 
confessions that have no audio-video recording. There are problems in 
implementation, for example, ensuring proper audio-video recording of 
any interrogation and access to lawyers. But this reform is nevertheless 
impressive and builds on trials conducted in police stations and deten-
tion centres since 2006 (both documents are summarised in the China 
Story Yearbook 2014). 
To add to this corpus of legislation, in October 2016, five central gov-
ernment bodies — the SPC, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Min-
istry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of 
Justice — issued a joint opinion that established the principle of putting the 
trial at the centre of criminal proceedings. The Opinion on the Promoting 
the Trial Centredness in Criminal Proceedings 关于推进以审判为中心的刑
事诉讼制度改革的意见 obligates the procuratorate in certain important 
cases to directly question the criminal suspect about whether their confes-
sion had been coerced or if there had been illegal collection of evidence. In 
June 2017, the same bodies issued Regulations on Several Issues Concern-
ing the Strict Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases 关
于办理刑事案件严格排除非法证据若干问题的规定, which include provi-
sions excluding evidence obtained by torture. During the ‘Two Sessions’ of 
March 2017, the Procurator-General, Cao Jianming 曹建民,	reported that 
in 2016 the procuratorate corrected 34,230 cases of illegal investigation 
practices, including extracting confessions by torture. Still, as noted in the 
CECC 2017 Annual Report, there had been no instances of criminal prose-
cution of investigators who engaged in these abusive practices.8 
Notwithstanding increasingly sophisticated legislation on the subject, 
in 2017 torture still appears to be a widespread practice in both average 
criminal cases and cases involving human rights activists. The weiquan 
lawyers detained or harassed in the crackdown of July 2015, including 
Wang Quanzhang and Wu Gan as well as Xie Yang 谢阳, Wang Yu 王宇, 
and Li Chunfu 李春富, have revealed the ordeals and violence they were 
subjected to while in detention.9 According to a report compiled by the 
China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, the Chinese authorities em-
ployed at least fifteen different types of torture or inhuman and degrading 
treatments against the lawyers and defenders held in the 2015 crackdown. 
These were intended to inflict physical harm and psychological detriment 
and included the use of electric shocks, sleep deprivation, and forced med-
ications, among others.10
In January 2017, to protest the decision of the authorities not to set 
him free after seventeen months of detention, Xie Yang’s legal team re-
leased the transcript of a conversation they had with their client. In it, Xie 
detailed the physical and mental torture to which he had been subject in 
detention. On 27 February, eleven diplomatic missions in Beijing wrote a 
letter to the Minister of Public Security, Guo Shenkun 郭聲琨, expressing 
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their growing concern over claims of torture and other cruel or degrading 
treatments and punishments in cases involving detained rights lawyers 
and other activists. 
In an unprecedented move, on 1 March, China’s official media re-
sponded to Xie’s allegations, and indirectly to the letter, claiming that he 
had fabricated the story about his torture to attract international atten-
tion. China’s state media accused lawyer Jiang Tianyong, who had been 
part of Xie’s legal team, of ‘making up fake news’; they featured an inter-
view with him admitting fabricating Xie’s claims. In May, the Changsha 
Intermediate People’s Court released a video in which Xie admitted having 
being ‘brainwashed’ while overseas, attending training in Hong Kong and 
South Korea to ‘develop Western constitutionalism in China’. He also de-
nied having been mistreated.11 
Stretching the Law Beyond its Limits
Violence, harassment, and intimidation of human rights activists or 
their families very often provide the corollary to legal measures. While 
arrests and detentions may expose the state to public scrutiny and have 
significant political costs, ‘measures operating in the shadows’12 are suffi-
ciently flexible to be used discretionarily by state authorities with fewer 
political costs. These include deprivation of physical liberty through ‘res-
idential surveillance’ 监视居住13 and ‘soft detention’ 软禁 (house arrest). 
Measures such as these are not strictly regulated by law. For instance, 
as mentioned above, Liu Xia has been under constant surveillance and 
intermittent house arrest since her husband’s arrest in 2008. After Liu 
Xiaobo’s death, she disappeared once again, and her friends were unable 
to contact her, despite official claims that she was ‘free’.14 She appeared 
in a YouTube video (in which the name of the filmmaker, as well as the 
place and date of filming were not specified) saying that she was mourning 
Liu Xiaobo’s passing outside Beijing; she apparently returned home only a 
month or so later.15   
The harassment of Liu Xia and her family and her years of constant 
surveillance and house arrest have occurred outside the remit of any es-
tablished laws. And this is not unusual — many other activists’ partners 
and families are subjected to similar treatment. 
Authorities reportedly harassed family members of those connected 
to the July 2015 crackdown through house arrest, constant surveillance, 
interference with their ability to travel, as well as pressuring landlords 
to evict them, and ordering school officials to deny admission to their 
children. This can go on for months or years.16 Families’ telephones are 
frequently tapped and their email traffic monitored. Police officers may 
watch and follow them, surveillance cameras may be installed near their 
homes and offices, and neighbours recruited to monitor them. Invitations 
to ‘have tea’ 喝茶 with state security agents (as discussed in the China Story 
Yearbook 2016: Control, Forum ‘Meet the State Security: Labour Activists 
and Their Controllers’, pp.65–73) or ‘being assigned a guard’ 被上岗 have 
been fairly common forms of intimidation for years. Authorities have 
closed organisations founded or operated by human rights defenders or 
strictly monitored their operations, rigorously controlling or cutting their 
sources of funding. Their offices and homes are recurrently subject to un-
Liu Xia
Photo: Luscious Lyon, Flickr
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authorised searches, and they are frequently faced with heavy fines for 
trivial administrative transgressions.17 
One of the extra-legal measures used against lawyers since 2007 is 
the threat of disbarring them. The 2016 Amendment to the Measures on 
Managing Lawyers’ Practice of Law 律师执业管理办法 and Measures on 
Managing Law Firms 律师事务所管理办法 compel lawyers to support 
the Party’s leadership and prohibits them from provoking dissatisfaction 
with the Party and the government, signing joint petitions, or issuing open 
letters that ‘undermine the judicial system’, and organising sit-in protests 
or other kinds of demonstrations outside judicial or other government 
agencies. The Measures on Managing Law Firms require firms to estab-
lish internal Party groups that participate in policymaking and manage-
ment. During a conference at the National Judges College in Beijing at the 
end of August 2017, Minister of Justice, Zhang Jun 张军,	further called on 
lawyers to refrain from engaging in protests, criticising judges and courts, 
or speaking or acting for personal gain or to boost their reputation. 
A Chilling Effect
Human rights lawyers and activists who have been harassed or ill-treated 
are warned or prevented from speaking out or writing about their ordeal. 
Yet over the past year, many victims of Chinese state repression have gone 
public. Labour activist Meng Han 猛汉, after spending twenty-one months 
in detention for ‘gathering crowds to disturb public order’, published on-
line his ‘Notes from Prison’, which not only spoke about his experience, 
but also his reflections on and hopes for the future of the Chinese labour 
movement.18 He would have known that publishing this would bring him 
more trouble, and the police once again briefly detained him. But it did 
not deter him in the least. In a new development, spouses of imprisoned 
lawyers and activists have also begun speaking out.
As mentioned above, HRW has dubbed the recent crackdown against 
human rights defenders in China the worst since the suppression of the 
democracy movement in 1989.19 Even more worrying is the international 
accommodation of China’s actions. In September, HRW released a report 
that scrutinised China’s activities at the United Nations (UN).20 According 
to the report, on several occasions in 2017, UN agencies made concessions 
towards China on matters related to human rights. In January, UN officials 
kept an estimated three thousand staff and NGO representatives from at-
tending a keynote speech by President Xi Jinping. In April, security offi-
cials removed ethnic Uyghur activist Dolkun Isa from the UN headquar-
ters in New York, where he was attending a forum on indigenous issues. 
Isa is General Secretary of the World Uyghur Congress and now a German 
citizen, having sought asylum following persecution in China. In July, Isa 
was also stopped and briefly detained by the police in Rome, acting on a 
request from Chinese authorities who claim that he is a terrorist, although 
he has publically condemned all forms of terrorism. 
These incidents raise serious questions about how the international 
community, including the UN, should respond to China’s human rights re-
cord at a time when China is exercising significant leverage on many coun-
tries in terms of economic statecraft, and has become the second-largest 
funder of the UN’s peacekeeping operations. While Chinese local activists 
continue to fight for rights under increasingly restrictive circumstances, 
they must surely be disheartened by this silence, if not complicity, by the 
international community. In July, while so many were grieving the death 
of Liu Xiaobo, US President Donald Trump was praising Xi Jinping as a 
‘terrific’ and ‘talented’ leader.21 The roots of the ‘chilling effect’ might be 
closer to home than people in the Western world may think. 
This text is taken from China Story Yearbook 2017: Prosperity, 
edited by Jane Golley and Linda Jaivin, published 2018 by ANU Press, 
The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
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